El Número Óptimo De Empresas Bajo Competencia De Bertrand (The Optimum Number of Firms Under Bertrand Competition)

Abstract:     
This paper is about a model of Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market with free entry of identical firms and variable returns to scale. If the optimum number of active firms in the market is two or more, and the number of active firms is equal to that optimum number, then Bertrand equilibrium exists for that optimum number, and it does not exist if the number of active firms is less than the optimum. The model, however, does not rule out the existence of Bertrand equilibria with more active firms than the optimum number. Finally, when the optimum number of active firms in the market is one, Bertrand equilibrium does not exist.

Note: Downloadable Document is in Portugese.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: Equilibrio de Bertrand, Rendimientos variables, Libre entrada, Número de empresa

JEL Classification: D43, L13

Accepted Paper Series