Subsidizing Charitable Giving with Rebates or Matching: Further Laboratory Evidence
Catherine C. Eckel
Texas A&M University
Philip J. Grossman
Monash University - Department of Economics
April 1, 2006
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 794-807, 2006
We examine two different ways to subsidize charitable giving: by a rebate (returning a portion of the donation to the giver) or by a match (adding additional donations to the giver's donation). In previous experimental research, we have shown that participants give more to charity under the match than under an equivalent rebate. The previous within-subject experimental design required participants to make a series of decisions under both types of subsidy. Each decision consisted of an allocation of an endowment between the subject and a charity chosen by the subject from a specified list. This article examines whether that result is an artifact of the previous within-subjects design: subjects may have failed to fully distinguish the two types of subsidy. In the current article, we report results from a between-subjects design, where participants are required to make only one type of decision – involving rebates or involving matching subsidies. Our results confirm previous findings.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 15
JEL Classification: C91, D64
Date posted: May 17, 2011
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.204 seconds