Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844580
 
 

References (27)



 


 



Testing Effectiveness of Executive Compensation - Discussion


Dan Weiss


Tel Aviv University - Faculty of Management

April 1, 2011

Journal of Management Accounting Research, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
The executive compensation literature has explored the executive pay-for-performance relation in various contexts and reported mixed findings. As a result, the question of whether executive incentives, and particularly stock options, are effective continues to pose a puzzle to researchers. Gong (JMAR, this issue) uses a long window to examine effectiveness of executive compensation. This note discusses several broad aspects of pay-for-performance studies and their potential manifestation in this line of research and in Gong's study. Specifically, I elaborate on measurement issues and focus on (i) The underlying paradigm: arm’s-length contracting versus managerial power, (ii) The distinction between the pay-for-performance relationship and CEO overpay, (iii) Market efficiency, and (iv) The settling-up problem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Executive, Compensation

JEL Classification: M41

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: May 18, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Weiss, Dan, Testing Effectiveness of Executive Compensation - Discussion (April 1, 2011). Journal of Management Accounting Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844580

Contact Information

Dan Weiss (Contact Author)
Tel Aviv University - Faculty of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 39010
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
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