Buying Votes and International Organizations
University of Heidelberg
James Raymond Vreeland
Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS); Georgetown University - Department of Government
May 18, 2011
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original data set on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: IMF, UN Security Council, voting, aid
JEL Classification: O19, O11, F35working papers series
Date posted: May 30, 2012
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