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Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme


Hannes Öhler


University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Peter Nunnenkamp


University of Kiel

Axel Dreher


University of Heidelberg

May 19, 2011

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3454

Abstract:     
Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appear to weaken the incentive to fight corruption over time.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: foreign aid, corruption, Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC effect

JEL Classification: F350, O170

working papers series


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Date posted: May 25, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Öhler, Hannes, Nunnenkamp, Peter and Dreher, Axel, Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (May 19, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3454. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1846428

Contact Information

Hannes Öhler
University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )
Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany
Peter Nunnenkamp
University of Kiel ( email )
D-24100 Kiel
Germany
Axel Dreher (Contact Author)
University of Heidelberg ( email )
Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de
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