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Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets


Harold L. Cole


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Felix Kubler


University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute

May 2011

NBER Working Paper No. w17064

Abstract:     
Marcet and Marimon (1994, revised 1998, revised 2011) developed a recursive saddle point method which can be used to solve dynamic contracting problems that include participation, enforcement and incentive constraints. Their method uses a recursive multiplier to capture implicit prior promises to the agent(s) that were made in order to satisfy earlier instances of these constraints. As a result, their method relies on the invertibility of the derivative of the Pareto frontier and cannot be applied to problems for which this frontier is not strictly concave. In this paper we show how one can extend their method to a weakly concave Pareto frontier by expanding the state space to include the realizations of an end of period lottery over the extreme points of a flat region of the Pareto frontier. With this expansion the basic insight of Marcet and Marimon goes through – one can make the problem recursive in the Lagrangian multiplier which yields significant computational advantages over the conventional approach of using utility as the state variable. The case of a weakly concave Pareto frontier arises naturally in applications where the principal's choice set is not convex but where randomization is possible.

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Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

working papers series


Date posted: May 23, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Cole, Harold L. and Kubler, Felix E., Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets (May 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17064. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1848580

Contact Information

Harold L. Cole (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
436 McNeil
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7788 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Felix E. Kubler
University of Zurich ( email )
Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

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