Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1850667
 
 

References (5)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Mobile Application Pricing


Joshua S. Gans


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

January 23, 2011


Abstract:     
This paper examines the pricing of mobile applications when application providers can either supply consumers directly or through a mobile platform (such as a smart phone or tablet). It is demonstrated that when platform access (i.e., purchasing a device) takes place in advance of application pricing, a non-trivial unravelling problem exists that rules out selling platform access at a positive price. Consequently, all platform revenues come from sharing application provider revenues. It is demonstrated that several restrictive conditions on application providers, such as most favoured customer clauses, can allow the platform provider to earn more profits and charge a positive access price increasing the likelihood the platform is provided.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: platform, two-sided markets, complements, most favoured customer clause

JEL Classification: L17, L32

working papers series





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Date posted: May 24, 2011 ; Last revised: September 10, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gans, Joshua S., Mobile Application Pricing (January 23, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1850667 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1850667

Contact Information

Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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