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Permanent Injunctions as Punitive Damages in Patent Infringement Cases


Paul J. Heald


University of Illinois College of Law; Bournemouth University - Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management (CIPPM)

May 24, 2011

Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 10-38

Abstract:     
Although much ink has been spilled over the decision of the Supreme Court in eBay v. Mercexchange to modify the test for equitable relief in patent cases and to nullify the long-standing presumption that victims of infringement are always entitled to permanent injunctions, an obvious point is never pursued: Injunctions in patent cases can function like punitive damages at common law. In cases where the infringer’s costs of switching to an alternative non-infringing technology are sufficiently high, patent "hold up" will occur, whereby the patentee will be able to negotiate a post-injunction license that exceeds the amount that would have been determined by an ex ante arms-length bargain (i.e., a reasonable royalty). Permanent injunctions that result in the recovery of an extra-compensatory bounty function like punitive damages and can be analyzed as such. This article examines the economic literature on punitive damages and identifies the limited set of circumstances where permanent injunctions are warranted.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

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Date posted: May 26, 2011 ; Last revised: June 9, 2011

Suggested Citation

Heald, Paul J., Permanent Injunctions as Punitive Damages in Patent Infringement Cases (May 24, 2011). Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 10-38. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1851681 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1851681

Contact Information

Paul J. Heald (Contact Author)
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
706-372-2567 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.illinois.edu/faculty/profile/PaulHeald

Bournemouth University - Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management (CIPPM)
89 Holdenhurst Road
Bournemouth
Dorset, BH8 8EB
United Kingdom
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