Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1854133
 
 

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Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement


Maria Bigoni


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Margherita Fort


University of Bologna

Mattia Nardotto


University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Tommaso Reggiani


Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics

May 23, 2011

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 752

Abstract:     
This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: education, field experiments, incentives, competition, cooperation

JEL Classification: A22, C93, I20

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Date posted: May 30, 2011 ; Last revised: September 10, 2014

Suggested Citation

Bigoni, Maria and Fort, Margherita and Nardotto, Mattia and Reggiani, Tommaso, Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement (May 23, 2011). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 752. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1854133 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1854133

Contact Information

Maria Bigoni (Contact Author)
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
Italy
+390512098122 (Phone)
Margherita Fort
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40100
Italy
Mattia Nardotto
University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )
Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mattianardotto/Home
Tommaso Reggiani
University of Milan, Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )
Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics ( email )
Bologna
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://www.eng.dse.unibo.it/
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