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Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs – Empirical Evidence


Gordon Klein


affiliation not provided to SSRN

May 1, 2011

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 10-107

Abstract:     
Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be eff ective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these e ffects are not straight-forward. It is even possible that there is an increase in the total number of cartels. Empirical evidence shows that the positive e ffect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot provide definite evidence, as inference is derived only by detected cartels. This study uses a more direct measure of success: the intensity of competition at the industry level of OECD countries. An instrumental variable approach, reveals a positive e ffect on industries' competition intensity of leniency programs indicating e ffectiveness in cartel destabilization and eff ective deterrence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: cartel, antitrust, leniency program

JEL Classification: C23, K21, K42, L41

working papers series


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Date posted: May 31, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Klein, Gordon, Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs – Empirical Evidence (May 1, 2011). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 10-107. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1854426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1854426

Contact Information

Gordon Klein (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
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