Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856123
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Optimal Tax Policy and the Symmetries of Ignorance


Chris William Sanchirico


University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

2012

Tax Law Review, Vol. 66, p. 1, 2012
University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economic Research Paper No. 11-19
U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-21

Abstract:     
What government-observable characteristics should determine the taxes that an individual pays and/or the transfers that she receives? This article focuses on a specific aspect of this fundamental question of tax policy: the implications of policymakers’ uncertainty regarding the outcomes of tax policy choices. The article identifies and questions two implicit premises in policy-uncertainty-based arguments against including taxable attributes other than labor earnings in the base. The first is that greater uncertainty surrounds the optimal taxation of non-labor-earnings attributes than surrounds the optimal taxation of labor earnings. The second is that tax policymakers ought to follow a kind of precautionary principle under which uncertainty regarding an attribute counsels base exclusion. The article explains why both premises are flawed.

The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967548

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Consumption Taxation, Income Taxation, Taxation of Capital Earnings, Inheritance Taxation, Redistributional Legal Rules, Optimal Taxation, Optimal Income Taxation, Optimal Redistribution, Policy Uncertainty

JEL Classification: H2, H21, H22, H23, H4, K00, K1, K34

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 3, 2011 ; Last revised: May 23, 2013

Suggested Citation

Sanchirico, Chris William, Optimal Tax Policy and the Symmetries of Ignorance (2012). Tax Law Review, Vol. 66, p. 1, 2012; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economic Research Paper No. 11-19; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-21. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856123 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1856123

Contact Information

Chris William Sanchirico (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4220 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csanchir/
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,831
Downloads: 364
Download Rank: 45,182
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.265 seconds