Don’t Be Ashamed to Say You Didn’t Get Much: Redistributive Effects of Information Disclosure in Donations and Inequity-Aversion in Charitable Giving

Abstract:     
We run a modified dictator game experiment to investigate the determinants of donation choices to philanthropic organizations. We find experimentally that the adoption of a simple form of accountability such as the disclosure of information on the ranking of aggregate contributions received by the organizations has important redistributive effects on donations, leading donors to reallocate their giving significantly from top to bottom performers. Our findings support the hypothesis that individuals have preferences on total donations and their ideal distribution, and not just on their own giving. Policy consequences of our findings in terms of public and private contribution disclosure rules are discussed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: altruism, strategic information, charitable-giving

JEL Classification: C91, D64, H00

working papers series