Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858680
 
 

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Asymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes Governing Land


Antony Dnes


Hull University Business School (HUBS)

Dean Lueck


Indiana University Maurer School of Law

January 1, 2009

Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper explains the structure of the law governing servitudes on land using key ideas from the economics of information, focusing on easements and covenants and the rules governing their formation and application. We develop a model of land markets that incorporates asymmetric information (adverse selection) and specialization in ownership and use this to offer a rationale for the seemingly ad hoc limits on the use of servitudes. We stress the inability of sellers of land
credibly to assure buyers that land is not encumbered by servitudes. Our model explains variations in legal doctrine over time and across jurisdictions, particularly comparing servitudes in the United States and in England.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: law and economics, property rights, servitudes

JEL Classification: K0, K11


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Date posted: June 6, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Dnes, Antony and Lueck, Dean, Asymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes Governing Land (January 1, 2009). Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858680

Contact Information

Antony Dnes (Contact Author)
Hull University Business School (HUBS) ( email )
Hull, HU6 7RX
United Kingdom
44-1482-465875 (Phone)
44-1482-466216 (Fax)
Dean Lueck
Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )
211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
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