Footnotes (50)



On Regulatory Arbitrage

Jordan M. Barry

University of San Diego School of Law

June 7, 2011

89 Texas Law Review See Also, 69 (2011)

This comment supplements and critiques the analytical framework put forth by Victor Fleischer in his recent work, Regulatory Arbitrage. It makes three main points. First, professional constraints on regulatory arbitrage are more valuable than has previously been acknowledged. Second, Fleischer correctly highlights how ongoing relationships allow parties to change the structures of their transactions to avoid regulations, yet still asserts that anti-avoidance legal rules are among the most effective tools to prevent regulatory arbitrage. Surprisingly, Fleischer understates this argument by failing to consider the extent to which such rules prevent family members, who are frequently joined by the tightest bonds of all, from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. Lastly, this comment takes issue with analogizing regulatory arbitrage to financial arbitrage, as well as the proposed categorization of various types of regulatory arbitrage. Each of these approaches diverts attention away from the underlying cause of regulatory arbitrage: legal rules that do not accurately track the economic substance of transactions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Regulatory Arbitrage, Tax, Regulatory Competition, Transaction Costs, Transaction Structures

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: June 9, 2011 ; Last revised: July 20, 2015

Suggested Citation

Barry, Jordan M., On Regulatory Arbitrage (June 7, 2011). 89 Texas Law Review See Also, 69 (2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1859750

Contact Information

Jordan Barry (Contact Author)
University of San Diego School of Law ( email )
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,262
Downloads: 225
Download Rank: 91,479
Footnotes:  50

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.281 seconds