Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860116
 
 

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Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly


Irina Hasnas


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Luca Lambertini


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Arsen Palestini


MEMOTEF - Sapienza University of Rome

June 8, 2011

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 753

Abstract:     
We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: R&D, spillovers, dynamic games

JEL Classification: C73, L13, O31

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Date posted: June 11, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Hasnas, Irina and Lambertini, Luca and Palestini, Arsen, Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly (June 8, 2011). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 753. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860116 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860116

Contact Information

Irina Hasnas (Contact Author)
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore, 45
Bologna
Italy
Luca Lambertini
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 051 2092600 (Phone)
+39 051 2092664 (Fax)
Arsen Palestini
MEMOTEF - Sapienza University of Rome ( email )
Via del Castro Laurenziano
Roma, Rome 00185
Italy
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