Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 753

25 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2011

See all articles by Irina Hasnas

Irina Hasnas

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Luca Lambertini

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Arsen Palestini

MEMOTEF - Sapienza University of Rome

Date Written: June 8, 2011

Abstract

We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival.

Keywords: R&D, spillovers, dynamic games

JEL Classification: C73, L13, O31

Suggested Citation

Hasnas, Irina and Lambertini, Luca and Palestini, Arsen, Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly (June 8, 2011). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 753, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860116 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860116

Irina Hasnas (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore, 45
Bologna
Italy

Luca Lambertini

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 051 2092600 (Phone)
+39 051 2092664 (Fax)

Arsen Palestini

MEMOTEF - Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano
Roma, Rome 00185
Italy

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