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Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing


Ramin Baghai


Stockholm School of Economics

Henri Servaes


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ane Tamayo


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

February 5, 2013


Abstract:     
We show that rating agencies have become more conservative in assigning credit ratings to corporations over the period 1985 to 2009. Holding firm characteristics constant, average ratings have dropped by three notches (e.g., from A to BBB ) over time. Consistent with the view that this change has not been fully warranted, we find that defaults for both investment grade and non-investment grade firms have declined over time. The increased stringency has also affected capital structure, growth, and debt spreads. Firms that suffer more from this conservatism issue less debt and have lower leverage; they are also less likely to obtain a debt rating and they experience lower sales growth. However, their debt spreads are lower compared to the spreads of firms with the same rating that have not suffered from this conservatism, which implies that the market partly undoes the impact of conservatism on debt prices. This evidence suggests that firms and capital markets do not perceive the increase in conservatism to be fully warranted.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: credit ratings, capital structure, debt issues, debt spreads

JEL Classification: G32

working papers series


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Date posted: June 12, 2011 ; Last revised: February 21, 2013

Suggested Citation

Baghai, Ramin, Servaes, Henri and Tamayo, Ane Miren, Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing (February 5, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860998 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860998

Contact Information

Ramin Baghai
Stockholm School of Economics ( email )
PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden
Henri Servaes (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7000 8268 (Phone)
+44 20 7000 8201 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.london.edu/hservaes/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Ane Miren Tamayo
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 78494689 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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