|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
The Coordination Value of Monetary Exchange: Experimental EvidenceGabriele CameraEconomics Science Institute, Chapman University; WWZ, University of Basel Marco CasariUniversity of Bologna - Department of Economics June 7, 2011 Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 754 Abstract: Under what conditions can cooperation be sustained in a network of strangers? Here we study the role of institutions and uncover a new behavioral foundation for the use of monetary systems. In an experiment, anonymous subjects could cooperate or defect in bilateral random encounters. This sequence of encounters was indefinite; hence multiple equilibria were possible, including full intertemporal cooperation supported by a social norm based on community punishment of defectors. We report that such social norm did not emerge. Instead, the availability of intrinsically worthless tokens favored the coordination on intertemporal cooperation in ways that networks of strangers were unable to achieve through social norms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51 Keywords: money, cooperation, information, trust, folk theorem, repeated games JEL Classification: C70, C90, D80 working papers seriesDate posted: June 11, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.344 seconds
