An Empirical Examination of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium
Richard M. Frankel
Washington University in Saint Louis - Olin Business School
Marilyn F. Johnson
Michigan State University - Department of Accounting & Information Systems
Douglas J. Skinner
The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 37, No 1, Spring 1999
Corporate conference calls are large-scale telephone conference calls during which managers make presentations to and answer questions from various market participants, usually about earnings. In this paper, we sample 1,056 corporate conference calls made by 808 firms during February-November 1995 to provide evidence on three questions: (1) whether conference calls provide information to stock market participants, (2) whether investors have equal access to the information provided during these calls, and (3) why managers of some firms hold conference calls while managers of other firms do not. We believe this research is important because managers? use of conference calls has grown enormously, yet we know little about how these calls affect investors.
JEL Classification: M41, M45, G14Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 16, 1999
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