Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1861861
 
 

Footnotes (262)



 


 



Injunctive Relief and Private Antitrust Enforcement


Sebastian Peyer


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

2011

CCP Working Paper No. 11-7

Abstract:     
The paper analyses the role of injunctions in the private enforcement of competition law. Most commentators deal predominantly with damages actions and the European policy proposals only discuss the conditions for successful compensation claims. However, damages claims are likely to be the most expensive and time consuming remedy available. In many cases injunctive relief may be cheaper and, thus, be preferred by the victim. Asking the court to order the perpetrator to either cease from certain behaviour or to undertake certain actions, plaintiffs might be willing to forego compensation in exchange for a quicker dispute solution with effect for the future. The variety and flexibility of injunctive relief–injunctions can be granted on a preliminary basis or permanently, contain a prohibition or being mandatory–provides victims of anticompetitive conduct with a multi-functional tool to seek relief. The paper compares the usage of and the legal framework for injunctive relief in England and Wales and Germany. The antitrust litigation data available for both jurisdictions indicate that the use of injunctive relief in English and German courts differs greatly. Analysing the legal framework for injunctive relief, I will look at the judicial approach that is taken with respect to injunctions and the possible reason for a varying usage of this remedy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Private antitrust enforcement, Injunction, Germany, UK, competition law

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 10, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Peyer, Sebastian, Injunctive Relief and Private Antitrust Enforcement (2011). CCP Working Paper No. 11-7. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1861861 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1861861

Contact Information

Sebastian Peyer (Contact Author)
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 558
Downloads: 149
Download Rank: 85,503
Footnotes:  262
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.375 seconds