University of Chicago Law School
June 8, 2011
University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 557
This article offers a new mechanism of law enforcement, combining sanctions and rewards into a scheme of “reversible rewards.” A law enforcer sets up a pre-committed fund and offers it as reward to another party to refrain from violation. If the violator turns down the reward, the enforcer can use the money in the fund for one purpose only - to pay for punishment of the violator. The article shows that this scheme doubles the effect of funds invested in enforcement, and allows enforcers to stop violations that would otherwise be too costly to deter. It argues that reversible rewards could be used to bolster enforcement in selective areas of private and public law, and could also be applied strategically in litigation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41working papers series
Date posted: June 13, 2011 ; Last revised: September 16, 2013
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.344 seconds