Abstract

  
 

References (38)



 


 



Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth


Luca Anderlini


Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Leonardo Felli


London School of Economics - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Giovanni Immordino


Università degli Studi di Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Alessandro Riboni


University of Montreal - Department of Economics
June 15, 2011

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3489

Abstract:     
We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation and growth. We compare a rigid (law set ex-ante) legal system and a flexible one (law set after observing current technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation and output growth at intermediate stages of technological development - periods when legal change is needed. The rigid system is preferable at early stages of technological development, when (lack of) commitment problems are severe. For mature technologies the two legal systems are equivalent. We find that rigid legal systems may induce excessive (greater than first-best) R&D investment and output growth.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: legal system, commitment, flexibility, innovation, growth

JEL Classification: O300, O430, L510, E610

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Immordino, Giovanni and Riboni, Alessandro, Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth (June 15, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3489. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865170

Contact Information

Luca Anderlini
Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-6361 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/
Leonardo Felli (Contact Author)
London School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 7525 (Phone)
+44 20 7831 1840 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/lfelli/index_own.html
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Giovanni Immordino
Università degli Studi di Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )
84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy
Alessandro Riboni
University of Montreal - Department of Economics ( email )
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca/liste_personnel/riboni.htm
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 434
Downloads: 113
Download Rank: 123,034
References:  38

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.609 seconds