Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866262
 


 



OFT Dairy Price-Fixing Case Leaves Sour Taste for Cooperating Parties in Settlements


Andreas Stephan


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

2010

European Competition Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 11, pp. 14-16, 2010

Abstract:     
The UK's Office of Fair Trading (OFT) was forced to scale down its investigation into dairy price fixing due to a lack of evidence, after most of the parties under investigation had agreed to settle their liability and pay fines. This paper discusses implications for cartel enforcement and the use of settlements.

Keywords: Antitrust, Cartels, Direct Settlement

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: June 17, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Andreas, OFT Dairy Price-Fixing Case Leaves Sour Taste for Cooperating Parties in Settlements (2010). European Competition Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 11, pp. 14-16, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866262

Contact Information

Andreas Stephan (Contact Author)
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
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