Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866384
 
 

References (25)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Expertise, Structure, and Reputation of Corporate Boards


Doron Levit


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

July 1, 2012


Abstract:     
This paper studies the optimal structure of the board with an emphasis on the expertise of directors. The analysis provides three main results. First, the expertise of a value-maximizing board can harm shareholder value. Second, it is optimal to design a board whose members are biased against the manager, especially when their expertise is high. Third, directors' desire to demonstrate expertise can shift power from the board to the manager on the expense of shareholders. The effect of these reputation concerns is amplified when the communication within the boardroom is transparent.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: Board of Directors, Communication, Information Acquisition, Expertise, Reputation, Transparency

JEL Classification: D74, D82, D83, L14, G34

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Date posted: June 20, 2011 ; Last revised: July 6, 2012

Suggested Citation

Levit, Doron, Expertise, Structure, and Reputation of Corporate Boards (July 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866384 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1866384

Contact Information

Doron Levit (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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References:  25
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