References (25)


Citations (3)



Expertise, Structure, and Reputation of Corporate Boards

Doron Levit

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

July 1, 2012

This paper studies the optimal structure of the board with an emphasis on the expertise of directors. The analysis provides three main results. First, the expertise of a value-maximizing board can harm shareholder value. Second, it is optimal to design a board whose members are biased against the manager, especially when their expertise is high. Third, directors' desire to demonstrate expertise can shift power from the board to the manager on the expense of shareholders. The effect of these reputation concerns is amplified when the communication within the boardroom is transparent.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: Board of Directors, Communication, Information Acquisition, Expertise, Reputation, Transparency

JEL Classification: D74, D82, D83, L14, G34

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: June 20, 2011 ; Last revised: July 6, 2012

Suggested Citation

Levit, Doron, Expertise, Structure, and Reputation of Corporate Boards (July 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866384 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1866384

Contact Information

Doron Levit (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,439
Downloads: 263
Download Rank: 75,957
References:  25
Citations:  3

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.328 seconds