Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1870728
 
 

References (68)



 


 



Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the Effervescence of Financial Crisis


Nicholas Dorn


Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London; Erasmus School of Law

July 2011

Law & Policy, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 428-448, 2011

Abstract:     
Certain financial market practices, previously denied or disregarded by financial market regulators, are being redefined as candidates for active investigation and enforcement. This article contrasts the passive stance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission vis‐à‐vis the Madoff fraud with its relatively diligent but now settled Complaint against Goldman Sachs. The article also explores compromises in the EU's approach to market regulation of information asymmetry, suggesting that grounds for pessimism outweigh those for hope. The introduction sets the context, describing aspects of the first leg of the crisis (states bail out banks) and the second leg (states themselves come under strain).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: June 23, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Dorn, Nicholas, Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the Effervescence of Financial Crisis (July 2011). Law & Policy, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 428-448, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1870728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00342.x

Contact Information

Nicholas Dorn (Contact Author)
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London
Charles Clore House
17 Russell Square
London, WC1B 5DR
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://ials.sas.ac.uk/about/staff/staffres.asp
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
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References:  68

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