Abstract

 
 

References (39)



 


 



Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution


Wolfgang Höchtl


University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics

Rupert Sausgruber


University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics & Statistics

Jean-Robert Tyran


University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

June 23, 2011

Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 11-18

Abstract:     
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: redistribution, self interest, inequality aversion, median voter, experiment

JEL Classification: A13, C9, D72

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 24, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Höchtl, Wolfgang , Sausgruber, Rupert and Tyran, Jean-Robert, Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution (June 23, 2011). Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 11-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1871723 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1871723

Contact Information

Wolfgang Höchtl
University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics ( email )
Austria
Rupert Sausgruber
University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics & Statistics ( email )
Universitaetsstrasse 15
Innsbruck, A - 6020
Austria
+43 512 507 7176 (Phone)
+43 512 507 2970 (Fax)
Jean-Robert Tyran (Contact Author)
University of Vienna ( email )
Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, 1090
Austria
HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/
University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )
Copenhagen University Library
Licenssekretariatet Nørre Alle 49
DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 361
Downloads: 54
Download Rank: 193,208
References:  39

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 4.047 seconds