Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution
University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics
University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics & Statistics
University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
June 23, 2011
Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 11-18
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31
Keywords: redistribution, self interest, inequality aversion, median voter, experiment
JEL Classification: A13, C9, D72working papers series
Date posted: June 24, 2011
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