On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
May 1, 2011
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 691
Competition law’s prohibition on price fixing and related horizontal agreements is one of its few uncontroversial provisions and is understood to be well grounded in economic principles that are taken to provide the foundation for competition policy. Upon examination, however, commonly offered views of the law’s conception of agreement prove to be difficult to articulate in an operational manner, at odds with key aspects of legal doctrine and practice, and unrelated to core elements of modern oligopoly theory. This Article explores these and other features of the agreement requirement and suggests the need for a wholesale revision of how competition law should approach the oligopoly problem.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 120
JEL Classification: K21, L41working papers series
Date posted: June 27, 2011 ; Last revised: September 24, 2013
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