Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873888
 


 



Property Rights and Market: Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process


Marco A. Marini


Sapienza Università di Roma ; CREI, University Rome III

February 28, 1996

Economic Systems, Vol. 4, No. 20, 1996

Abstract:     
The paper presents a game-theoretic model in order to investigate to what extent an employee privatization program of a State owned firm can be feasible under certain assumptions concerning the players' objective functions and the market structure in which the firm operates. The public managers are assumed interested in the firm's value, while the workers aim at maximizing the per capita surplus over the wage. The privatization process is then described as a bargaining process between the government in the role of core investor in the firm's physical assets and the workers of the firm, whose only asset is their personal skill. In the model the market structure in which the firm sells its product is assumed to be imperfectly competitive. After presenting the case of a monopolistic firm, the paper explores what happens if the firm plays a duopoly quantity game. The final section is devoted to introducing to the analysis an x-efficiency cost proportional to the public share of the ownership.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Privatization, Bargaining, State-owned Firms

JEL Classification: C7, D23, L22, L33, J54

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Date posted: June 29, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Marini, Marco A., Property Rights and Market: Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process (February 28, 1996). Economic Systems, Vol. 4, No. 20, 1996. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873888

Contact Information

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)
Sapienza Università di Roma ( email )
Via Ariosto, 25
Rome, 00181
Italy
+390677274044 (Phone)
+390677274033 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/marini/
CREI, University Rome III ( email )
Via Ostiense, 161
Rome, 00154
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/
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