Abstract

 


 



Note on the Calibration of Executive Compensation Models


Ingolf Dittmann


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Tinbergen Institute; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Dan Zhang


BI Norwegian Business School

Ernst G. Maug


University of Mannheim - Department of Business Administration and Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Oliver G. Spalt


Tilburg University - Department of Finance

September 17, 2011


Abstract:     
This note is intended for researchers who want to implement the Dittmann and Maug (2007) calibration method. This method allows to test a complete principal-agent model with individual-level data on executive pay. The method consists of two steps. First, the principal-agent model is simplified so that it can be calibrated to the data for an individual CEO. After that, the calibrated model yields predictions about the optimal contract of this CEO, and these predictions can then be compared to observed contracts. This note contains step-by-step instructions on how to replicate the core results of Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010). We report intermediate results for an example CEO, so that different parts of the program code can be tested individually.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: Stock Options, Executive Compensation, Loss Aversion

JEL Classification: G30, M52

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 5, 2011 ; Last revised: November 23, 2011

Suggested Citation

Dittmann, Ingolf, Zhang, Dan, Maug, Ernst G. and Spalt, Oliver G., Note on the Calibration of Executive Compensation Models (September 17, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1876670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1876670

Contact Information

Ingolf Dittmann (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 4081283 (Phone)
+31 10 4089165 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/
Tinbergen Institute
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Dan Zhang
BI Norwegian Business School ( email )
Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0442
Norway
HOME PAGE: http://www.bi.edu/research/academic-homepage/?ansattid=A1210112
Ernst G. Maug
University of Mannheim - Department of Business Administration and Finance ( email )
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://cf.bwl.uni-mannheim.de
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Oliver G. Spalt
Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )
Department of Finance
Tilburg University
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 3545 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.oliverspalt.com
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 694
Downloads: 150
Download Rank: 98,010

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.593 seconds