Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878513
 
 

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Public Disclosure of Players’ Conduct and Common Resources Harvesting: Experimental Evidence from a Nairobi Slum


Leonardo Becchetti


University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics

Pierluigi Conzo


University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics ; Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Giacomo Degli Antoni


University of Parma

July 4, 2011

CEIS Working Paper No. 200

Abstract:     
We evaluate the effect of information disclosure on players’ behaviour in a multi-period common pool resource game experiment run in an area of notably scarce social capital such as the Nairobi slum of Kibera. We document divergence of average withdrawal rates across time with an increasingly lower cooperation in the non-anonymous setting. We demonstrate that information induced asymmetric conformity contributes to explain what we observe, that is, players who withdraw less than the average of the group in the previous round react more negatively when individual payoffs are disclosed than when they are not, and their reaction is less than compensated by the mean reversion of those who withdrew more. Our results are consistent with the (Ostrom, 2000) hypothesis that, in absence of punishment, disclosure of information about individual (cooperative or non cooperative) behaviour makes common resource management more difficult and tragedy of the commons easier.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: common pool resource game, conformism, information disclosure field experiments, tragedy of commons

JEL Classification: C93, Q20, H40

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Date posted: July 4, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Conzo, Pierluigi and Degli Antoni, Giacomo, Public Disclosure of Players’ Conduct and Common Resources Harvesting: Experimental Evidence from a Nairobi Slum (July 4, 2011). CEIS Working Paper No. 200. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1878513

Contact Information

Leonardo Becchetti (Contact Author)
University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy
Pierluigi Conzo
University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )
Campus Luigi Einaudi
Lungo Dora Siena 100 A
Torino, Torino 10153
Italy
011/6703892 (Phone)
011/6703895 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.unito.it/unitoWAR/page/dipartimenti4/D031/D031_personale_batch_BasicBook_Docenti_IT7?id=4
Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )
84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/Conzo
Giacomo Degli Antoni
University of Parma ( email )
Via Dell'Università, 12
Parma, 43121
Italy

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