Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle
IDEI, Université de Toulouse I.; University of Roma II, Tor Vergata
University of Rome II - Economics
Universite du Luxembourg
July 5, 2011
CEIS Working Paper No. 201
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its power in games with a single agent.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Competing Mechanisms, Exclusivity
JEL Classification: D82working papers series
Date posted: July 5, 2011
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