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On the Stability of Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria with CSR Firms


Luca Lambertini


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Alessandro Tampieri


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

July 5, 2011

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 768

Abstract:     
This paper examines the stability conditions of the equilibria in a market where profit-maximizing and CSR firms coexist in the presence of an environmental externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is stable for low impact of productivity on pollution and high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus. In addition, a mixed oligopoly equilibrium is stable if the number of CSR is sufficiently low.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: CSR, stability

JEL Classification: H23, L13, O31

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Date posted: July 5, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Lambertini, Luca and Tampieri, Alessandro, On the Stability of Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria with CSR Firms (July 5, 2011). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 768. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879166 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879166

Contact Information

Luca Lambertini (Contact Author)
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 051 2092600 (Phone)
+39 051 2092664 (Fax)
Alessandro Tampieri
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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