Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880149
 
 

References (32)



 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management?


Brian J. Bushee


University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Michael J. Jung


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Gregory S. Miller


University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

July 11, 2013


Abstract:     
This paper examines whether selective access to corporate managers allows investors to revise their beliefs and execute profitable trades. We examine whether investors benefit from two potential opportunities for selective access at invitation-only investor conferences: one-on-one meetings with managers throughout the day and breakout sessions with managers after the webcast presentation. We find significant increases in trade sizes during the hours when firms provide offline access to investors, consistent with selective access providing investors with information that they perceive to be valuable enough to trade upon. We also find significant potential trading gains concentrated primarily in three-day horizons after the conference for firms providing formal offline access, suggesting that selective access can lead to profitable trading opportunities. Our evidence suggests that selective access to management conveys benefits to certain investors even in the post-Reg FD period.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: Regulation Fair Disclosure, Selective Disclosure, Conference Presentations, Informed Trading

JEL Classification: M41, K22

working papers series





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Date posted: July 7, 2011 ; Last revised: July 12, 2013

Suggested Citation

Bushee, Brian J. and Jung, Michael J. and Miller, Gregory S., Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management? (July 11, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880149 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1880149

Contact Information

Brian J. Bushee (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-4872 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

Michael J. Jung
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
212-998-0193 (Phone)

Gregory S. Miller
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
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