Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management?
Brian J. Bushee
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
Michael J. Jung
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business
Gregory S. Miller
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
July 11, 2013
This paper examines whether selective access to corporate managers allows investors to revise their beliefs and execute profitable trades. We examine whether investors benefit from two potential opportunities for selective access at invitation-only investor conferences: one-on-one meetings with managers throughout the day and breakout sessions with managers after the webcast presentation. We find significant increases in trade sizes during the hours when firms provide offline access to investors, consistent with selective access providing investors with information that they perceive to be valuable enough to trade upon. We also find significant potential trading gains concentrated primarily in three-day horizons after the conference for firms providing formal offline access, suggesting that selective access can lead to profitable trading opportunities. Our evidence suggests that selective access to management conveys benefits to certain investors even in the post-Reg FD period.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56
Keywords: Regulation Fair Disclosure, Selective Disclosure, Conference Presentations, Informed Trading
JEL Classification: M41, K22
Date posted: July 7, 2011 ; Last revised: July 12, 2013
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