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File name: SSRN-id1880189. ; Size: 954K
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Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics
Walter E. Block
Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business
Thomas DiLorenzo
Loyola College in Maryland - The Joseph A. Sellinger, S.J. School of Business and Management
July 6, 2011
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, No. 4, 2000
Abstract:
According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both devices through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of voluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as constitutional economics. We believe that the analogy between politics and markets made by constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clouds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics has very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the marketplace.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 9
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Date posted: July 8, 2011
Suggested CitationBlock, Walter E. and DiLorenzo, Thomas, Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics (July 6, 2011). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, No. 4, 2000. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880189
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