Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict
Kai A. Konrad
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2011-07
We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: altruism, spite, in-group favoritism, conflict, evolutionary stability, indirect evolutionary approach
JEL Classification: C72, D03, D64, D74working papers series
Date posted: July 8, 2011 ; Last revised: January 2, 2012
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