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Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza: The Value of Collective Action


Georgiy V. Bobashev


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Maureen Cropper


World Bank; University of Maryland; Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER)

Joshua Epstein


Johns Hopkins University

D. Michael Goedecke


RTI International

Stephen Hutton


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mead Over


Center for Global Development

July 2011

NBER Working Paper No. w17195

Abstract:     
This paper examines positive externalities and complementarities in the use of antiviral pharmaceuticals to mitigate pandemic influenza. The paper demonstrates the presence of treatment externalities in simple epidemiological SIR models, and then through simulations of a Global Epidemiological Model, in which the pandemic spreads between cities through the international airline network, and between cities and rural areas through ground transport. While most treatment benefits are private, spillovers may mean that it is in the self-interest of rich countries to pay for some AV treatment in poor countries. The most cost-effective policy is for rich countries to donate doses to the outbreak source country; however, donating doses to poor countries in proportion to their populations may also be cost-effective. These results depend on the transmissibility of the flu strain, the efficacy of antivirals in reducing transmissibility and on the proportion of infectious that can be identified and treated.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

working papers series


Date posted: July 11, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Bobashev, Georgiy V., Cropper, Maureen L., Epstein, Joshua, Goedecke, D. Michael, Hutton, Stephen and Over, Mead, Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza: The Value of Collective Action (July 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17195. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1882163

Contact Information

Georgiy V. Bobashev (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
No Address Available
Maureen L. Cropper
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-1277 (Phone)
202-522-3230 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/mcropper
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
United States
Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER) ( email )
3040 Cornwallis Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194
United States
Joshua Epstein
Johns Hopkins University ( email )
Washington, DC 20036-1984
United States
D. Michael Goedecke
RTI International ( email )
3040 Cornwallis Road
P.O. Box 12194
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194
United States
Stephen Hutton
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Mead Over
Center for Global Development ( email )
1800 Massachusetts Ave NW
Third Floor
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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