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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1882903
 
 

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The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning


Frederick Tung


Boston University School of Law


Boston University Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 1175-1190, May 2011
Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-33
Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-33

Abstract:     
In this symposium paper, I discuss and critique some new empirical learning on independent directors.

The independent director has always offered a sort of magic bullet for corporate governance, representing the idealized monitor of executives’ behavior. Yet we corporate law scholars also harbor some ambivalence about the magic of this bullet. As much as we want to trust in the promise of independent directors, no solid empirical evidence exists to suggest that independent directors add value. Moreover, we have seen spectacular failures in the face of independent boards.

How do we account for this disconnect between our intuitions and best intentions, on the one hand, and the stubborn refusal of the empirical evidence to confirm our faith in independent directors? Several possibilities come to mind. First, existing definitions of independence may be too lax. Independence requirements may fail to screen out important conflicts. A second possibility (not exclusive of the first) is that firms may be heterogeneous, such that optimal board composition may vary across firms. Independent boards may add value at some firms but not others. An emerging theoretical literature argues, for example, that firms’ information environments matter for independent directors’ efficacy.

Monitors’ incentives and information are central to constraining agency costs. Happily, two recent empirical studies tackle these important issues. On incentives, one study investigates whether the existence of common backgrounds between CEOs and their nominally independent directors may affect directors’ monitoring. Another recent study focuses on directors’ costs of acquiring information about their firms and the effects of these costs on independent directors’ effectiveness. These studies suggest that the independent director’s place in corporate governance may be more complicated than we thought. We may need to refine our trust in independent directors and tailor our expectations about their utility.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: independent directors, corporate governance, agency costs, monitoring, information costs, social ties, information asymmetry, outside directors

JEL Classification: D23, G30, G34, K22

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Date posted: July 12, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Tung, Frederick, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning. Boston University Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 1175-1190, May 2011; Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-33; Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-33. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1882903

Contact Information

Frederick Tung (Contact Author)
Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
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