Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments
Catherine C. Eckel
Texas A&M University
Charles A. Holt
University of Virginia - Department of Economics
September 1, 1989
American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, p. 763, 1989
This paper reports results of committee voting experiments in which a fixed agenda specifies a sequence of binary decisions. The outcome depends on whether voting is myopic or strategic. Subjects initially voted in accordance with myopic-voting rules; strategic-voting behavior was more prevalent with experience. The use of the same induced preferences in successive meetings was more likely to induce strategic voting than the provision of public information concerning the numbers of voters of each preference type.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 11, 2011
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