Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884171
 
 

References (47)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



The Effects of Ownership and Stock Liquidity on the Timing of Repurchase Transactions


Amedeo De Cesari


University of Manchester - Manchester Business School - Finance & Accounting Group

Susanne Espenlaub


University of Manchester - Manchester Business School

Arif Khurshed


University of Manchester - Manchester Business School, Division of Accounting Finance

Michael Simkovic


Seton Hall Law School; Fordham University School of Law; Harvard Law School - John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics

June 6, 2012


Abstract:     
We analyze detailed monthly data on U.S. open market stock repurchases (OMRs) that recently became available following stricter disclosure requirements. We find evidence that OMRs are timed to benefit non-selling shareholders. We present evidence that the profits to companies from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Institutional ownership reduces companies’ opportunities to repurchase stock at bargain prices. At low levels, insider ownership increases timing profits and at high levels it reduces them. Stock liquidity increases profits from timing OMRs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: open market repurchase, timing, ownership, liquidity

JEL Classification: G35, G38


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 12, 2011 ; Last revised: August 26, 2012

Suggested Citation

De Cesari, Amedeo and Espenlaub, Susanne and Khurshed, Arif and Simkovic, Michael, The Effects of Ownership and Stock Liquidity on the Timing of Repurchase Transactions (June 6, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884171 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1884171

Contact Information

Amedeo De Cesari (Contact Author)
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School - Finance & Accounting Group ( email )
Crawford House
Booth Street East
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 161 2754298 (Phone)
Susanne Espenlaub
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School ( email )
Booth Street West
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom
Arif Khurshed
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School, Division of Accounting Finance ( email )
Crawford House
Oxford Road
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom
+44 0 161 275 4475 (Phone)
+44 0 161 275 4023 (Fax)
Michael Simkovic
Seton Hall Law School ( email )
One Newark Center
Newark, NJ 07102-5210
United States
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
Harvard Law School - John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,364
Downloads: 726
Download Rank: 16,536
References:  47
Citations:  4

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.312 seconds