Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884696
 
 

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Monopoly and Regulation in Industrializing England: Evidence from the Infrastructure Sector


Daniel E. Bogart


University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

July 13, 2011


Abstract:     
The infrastructure sector poses a challenge to the view that England had open and competitive markets during its industrializing era. The British national government granted thousands of infrastructure monopolies with rights to levy tolls in the 1700s and early 1800s. This paper shows, however, that most infrastructure providers did not earn monopoly profits. Rates of return to investors were about the same as the yield on long-term government bonds. A highly fragmented market structure was a key reason. Herfindahl measures indicate substantial fragmentation in the market for toll roads. Moreover, a lower level of concentration is shown to cause lower rates of return across English counties. Market fragmentation is linked with a regulatory framework that imposed low barriers to entry in the infrastructure sector.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Rent-Seeking, Regulation, Turnpike roads, Britain, Industrial Revolution

JEL Classification: K23, N43, N73

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Date posted: July 15, 2011 ; Last revised: October 17, 2011

Suggested Citation

Bogart, Daniel E., Monopoly and Regulation in Industrializing England: Evidence from the Infrastructure Sector (July 13, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884696 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1884696

Contact Information

Daniel E. Bogart (Contact Author)
University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )
3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
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