Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=188548
 
 

Citations (162)



 
 

Footnotes (20)



 


 



Aggregating Governance Indicators


Daniel Kaufmann


The Brookings Institution

Aart Kraay


World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Pablo Zoido


Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

October 1999

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2195

Abstract:     
In recent years, the growing interest of academics and policymakers in governance has been reflected in the proliferation cross-country indices measuring various aspects of governance. In this paper we explain how a simple variant of an unobserved components model can be used to combine the information from these different sources into aggregate governance indicators. The main advantage of this method is that it allows us to quantify the precision of the both individual sources of governance data as well as the aggregate governance indicators. We will illustrate the methodology by constructing aggregate indicators of bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and graft, for a large sample of 160 countries. Although these aggregate governance indicators are more informative about the level of governance than any individual indicator, the standard errors associated with estimates of governance are still large relative to the units in which governance is measured.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

JEL Classification: C1, C3, C42, C43, D8, HO, H4, KO, K2, K4

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: November 5, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Kaufmann, Daniel and Kraay, Aart and Zoido, Pablo, Aggregating Governance Indicators (October 1999). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2195. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=188548 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.188548

Contact Information

Daniel Kaufmann
The Brookings Institution ( email )
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-797-6257 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.thekaufmannpost.net
Aart Kraay
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )
1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-5756 (Phone)
202-522-3518 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/akraay
Pablo Zoido (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 15,910
Downloads: 4,203
Download Rank: 964
Citations:  162
Footnotes:  20

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.328 seconds