The Costs of Judging Judges by the Numbers
Marin K. Levy
Duke University - School of Law
Yale University - Law School
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
July 6, 2010
Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2010
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 439
Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 237
This essay discredits current empirical models that are designed to “judge” or rank appellate judges, and then assesses the harms of propagating such models. First, the essay builds on the discussion of empirical models by arguing that (1) the judicial virtues that the legal empiricists set out to measure have little bearing on what actually makes for a good judge; and (2) even if they did, the empiricists’ chosen variables have not measured those virtues accurately. The essay then concludes that by generating unreliable claims about the relative quality of judges, these studies mislead both decision-makers and the public, degrade discussions of judging, and could, if taken seriously, detrimentally alter the behavior of judges themselves.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13
Keywords: appellate judgesAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 15, 2011 ; Last revised: October 3, 2011
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.328 seconds