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Teleworking and Congestion: A Dynamic Bottleneck Analysis


Sergejs Gubins


VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Erik T. Verhoef


VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics; VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)

July 18, 2011

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-096/3

Abstract:     
We analyze the welfare effects of part-day teleworking on road traffic congestion in the context of Vickrey's dynamic bottleneck model. Endogenous decisions to become equipped with a teleworking-enabling technology change the scheduling of arrival times at work for equipped drivers and, due to congestion externalities, affects travel costs of all drivers. We show that even costless teleworking might be marginally welfare reducing, after reaching the optimal penetration level, as an equipped driver imposes a higher travel externality on other equipped drivers than unequipped drivers do. We study various possible market configurations for the supply of the technology, and find that private monopolistic supply of the technology might yield a higher social welfare than perfectly competitive supply.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: traffic congestion, teleworking, bottleneck model

JEL Classification: D62, O33, R41, R48

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Date posted: July 19, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Gubins, Sergejs and Verhoef, Erik T., Teleworking and Congestion: A Dynamic Bottleneck Analysis (July 18, 2011). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-096/3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1888241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1888241

Contact Information

Sergejs Gubins (Contact Author)
VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )
De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
Erik T. Verhoef
VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )
De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 020 4446094 (Phone)
+31 020 4446004 (Fax)
VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
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