References (55)


Citations (1)



The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jo Seldeslachts

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

July 2011

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8482

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports by the U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986-1999 period of the conditional probabilities for eliciting investigations, challenges, prohibitions, court-wins and court-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from the economics of crime literature. We find the challenge-rate to robustly deter future horizontal (both relative and absolute) merger activity; the investigation-rate to slightly deter relative-horizontal merger activity; the court-loss-rate to moderately affect absolute-horizontal merger activity; and the prohibition-rate and court-win-rate to not significantly deter future horizontal mergers. Accordingly, the conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence effect from amongst the different merger policy instruments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L49

Date posted: July 20, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Clougherty , Joseph A. and Seldeslachts, Jo, The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments (July 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8482. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890005

Contact Information

Joseph A. Clougherty (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )
1206 S. Sixth Street
350 Wohlers Hall, MC-706
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Jo Seldeslachts
University of Amsterdam ( email )
Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 227
Downloads: 1
References:  55
Citations:  1

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.391 seconds