Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1892001
 
 

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'Relational' Procurement Contracts: A Simple Model of Reputation Mechanism


Gian Luigi Albano


Consip S.p.A./Consip Ltd (The National Central Purchasing Body)

Cesi Berardino


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alberto Iozzi


Universita degli Studi di Roma

July 20, 2011

CEIS Working Paper No. 209

Abstract:     
We show how repeatedly awarded procurement contracts where unverifiable quality dimensions are relevant can be reinterpreted as relational contracts between a buyer and a contractor that is threatened by a potentially less efficient competitor. We compare two scenarios: 1) Under freedom of choices the (public) buyer freely chooses the contractor, the price and the (unverifiable) quality it should stick to, 2) in a competitive discretionary tendering the buyer evaluates differently the bids of the suppliers by means of a handicap, based on the firm's past performance. We show that, if firms' costs are common knowledge, relational discriminatory tenderings replicates the results of long term contracting (freedom of choice). The handicap ensures the existence of a relational contract under which the buyer selects the more efficient firm and pays it a price higher than its cost, and the firm delivers the required quality. This outcome is an equilibrium when thecost of quality is not too high, and the players' discount factor and the valuation of quality are not small. A self-enforcing relational contract entails an handicap which is closer to the difference between the firms' specific-cost, the lower is the variable cost of quality and the higher is the players' discount factor.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: public procurement, relational contracts, unverifiable quality, handicap

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Date posted: July 22, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Albano, Gian Luigi and Berardino, Cesi and Iozzi, Alberto, 'Relational' Procurement Contracts: A Simple Model of Reputation Mechanism (July 20, 2011). CEIS Working Paper No. 209. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1892001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1892001

Contact Information

Gian Luigi Albano (Contact Author)
Consip S.p.A./Consip Ltd (The National Central Purchasing Body) ( email )
Via Isonzo, 19/E
Roma, 00198
Italy
+39 06 85449.627 (Phone)
Cesi Berardino
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Alberto Iozzi
Universita degli Studi di Roma ( email )
Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy
39 06 7259 5923 (Phone)
39 06 204 02 19 (Fax)
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