Direct Versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
July 21, 2011
Journal of Legal Analysis, Forthcoming
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 703
This article compares two policies toward coordinated oligopolistic price elevation. Most commentators endorse the view that the law should (and does) prohibit only those price elevations produced by certain sorts of interfirm communications, such as secret price negotiations. In contrast, little attention has been devoted to a more direct approach that encompasses all coordinated price elevations that can be detected and sanctioned effectively. It is demonstrated that the conventional formulation rests on numerous misconceptions, involves complex and costly detection if its logical implications are taken seriously, and tends to target cases with relatively low deterrence benefits and high chilling costs in contrast to those targeted under the direct approach.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 78
JEL Classification: D43, K21, L13, L41Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 22, 2011
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.485 seconds