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Narrative Preferences and Administrative Due Process


Jason Alexis Cade


University of Georgia Law School; NYU School of Law

July 1, 2011

Harvard Latino Law Review, Vol. 14, p. 156, 2011
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-53

Abstract:     
This Article illustrates, through sociolinguistic analysis, how an adjudicator’s biases against certain narrative styles can influence his or her assessments of credibility, treatment of parties, and decision-making in the administrative law setting. Poverty lawyers have long observed that many claimants in the administrative state continue to face procedural and discursive obstacles. Applying insights from a growing field of inter-disciplinary research, including conversation analysis, linguistics, and cognitive studies, this Article builds upon those observations by more precisely exploring through a case study of an unemployment insurance benefits hearing how structural and narrative biases can work to deny an applicant due process and exacerbate unequal power dynamics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: narrative, due process, administrative, poverty, cognitive studies, inter-disciplinary, unemployment benefits, Harvard Latino Law Review, interdisciplinary, conversation analysis, linguistics, ALJ, New York University, clinical, lucie white, sunday shoes

JEL Classification: J65

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Date posted: July 26, 2011 ; Last revised: October 1, 2012

Suggested Citation

Cade, Jason Alexis, Narrative Preferences and Administrative Due Process (July 1, 2011). Harvard Latino Law Review, Vol. 14, p. 156, 2011; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-53. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1892313

Contact Information

Jason Alexis Cade (Contact Author)
University of Georgia Law School ( email )
Athens, GA 30602
United States
(706) 542-5188 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uga.edu/profile/jason-cade
NYU School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212.992.8862 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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