Do Treaties Encourage Technology Transfer? Evidence from the Paris Convention

38 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2011

See all articles by Petra Moser

Petra Moser

NYU Stern Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Kamran Bilir

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics

Irina Talis

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: July 22, 2011

Abstract

An important goal of international treaties such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement is to encourage technology transfer and knowledge flows across countries. This analysis uses the U.S. accession to the Paris Convention in 1887 - four years after the treaty was originally established - to examine the effects of treaty rights on international knowledge flows, measured as changes in patenting by foreign nationals. The U.S. accession strengthened U.S. patent rights for nationals from countries that had signed the treaty before the United States, but had no effect on nationals from other countries. An analysis of 86,000 U.S. patents between 1865 and 1914 indicates that nationals from the original member countries increased their patenting activity in the United States by more than 40 percent after U.S. accession compared with nationals from other countries. Importantly, the effects of the treaty were strongest for nationals from countries with high pre-treaty levels of development and education, that were most able to respond to stronger property rights.

Suggested Citation

Moser, Petra and Bilir, Kamran and Talis, Irina, Do Treaties Encourage Technology Transfer? Evidence from the Paris Convention (July 22, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1893052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1893052

Petra Moser (Contact Author)

NYU Stern Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10003
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Kamran Bilir

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics ( email )

Madison, WI 53706
United States

Irina Talis

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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