Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1896376
 


 



Sharing Rules and Individual Incentives: Implications to Collaboration


Sanjiv Erat


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

July 27, 2011


Abstract:     
Economic agents collaborate and jointly produce value in a variety of contexts. Oftentimes, the application of an implicit or explicit “sharing rule” determines how this created value is allocated between the collaborators. The current article examines how the broader collaboration patterns in a population arise as a result of the individual incentives provided by these sharing rules.

Our analytical model reveals that sharing rules result in (i) (relative) homophily in the groups wherein group members are less likely to collaborate with people outside the group, (ii) decreased collaboration in the population as a whole, and (iii) decreased collaboration among the group that is (systematically) disadvantaged by the sharing rule. Finally, we use US patenting data to offer an empirical test, and we offer evidence that sharing rules influence collaboration patterns in patenting as predicted by our model.

working papers series


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Date posted: July 28, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Erat, Sanjiv, Sharing Rules and Individual Incentives: Implications to Collaboration (July 27, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1896376 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1896376

Contact Information

Sanjiv Erat (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.rady.ucsd.edu/faculty/directory/erat/
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